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GOD, REVELATION, AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH: 
SOME THEMES AND PROBLEMS IN 
THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH 
Robert C. Coburn 
This paper begins with an explanation of why, despite their obscurity, 
Tillich's writings have been attractive to a wide audience. I then describe 
some of the main features of his mature theological position and discuss a 
number of the central questions and difficulties to which this position gives 
rise. The discussion focuses on such questions as whether Tillich can justify 
holding his own "interpretations" of traditional Christian ideas to have a 
privileged status, whether the deliteralization of traditional Christian lan-
guage is compatible with the idea that Christianity is a historical religion, 
how we are to understand Tillich's notion of a symbolic or mythological 
account's being adequate to revelatory experience, what it is for a "practical 
interpretation" of revelatory experience to be an adequate expression of 
such experience, and what is the best way of handling the problems raised 
by TiIlich's claim that there are no literally true statements-or only one lit-
erally true statement-about God. 
I 
James Luther Adams writes that a publisher to whom he had sent the 
collection of Paul Tillich's papers that eventually came out under the 
title The Protestallt Era decided against publication owing in part to the 
negative review provided by a prominent American theologian. Just a 
lot of "German gobbledegook," the reviewer had said.' Brand Blanshard 
reports that when Tillich gave a paper at the New York Philosophy Club 
on "the Absolute and the Ground of Being," his audience contained, 
along with other philosophical luminaries of the day, G. E. Moore, who 
was visiting Columbia at the time. The custom of the Club was for each 
member of the audience to be given the opportunity to make a response 
to the paper, which the speaker would then address as seemed appro-
priate. "We all waited for Moore's turn with an uneasy curiosity," 
Blanshard writes. "When it came, there was an ominous pause followed 
by an explosion: 'I am sorry to say that there is not a single sentence that 
Professor Tillich has uttered that I was able to understand-not a single 
sentence!' ."2 
There are many reasons for the near-impenetrability of much of 
Tillich's prose. His mastery of English remained imperfect. Many of his 
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writings grew out of popular lectures in which he could do little by way 
of clarifying the intellectual context from which his thought emerged. 
The intellectual tradition that nourished and shaped his development did 
not place much stress on clarity and precision of formulation, with the 
result that he remained comfortable with a style of presentation that did 
not maximize lucidity.3 The systematic character of his thought makes it 
difficult to grasp various parts of it without first acquiring some under-
standing of much of the rest. Many of his central concepts require for 
their adequate comprehension an understanding of the philosophical and 
theological traditions out of which they come. And some of his writings 
appear more concerned to "transform" (or change his audience) than to 
"inform" (or convey clearly expressed thoughts to) it. 
Despite this obscurity, his theological and homiletical writings contin-
ue to strike a responsive chord in many readers. Tn this paper, I shall, 
first, indicate some of the main features of Tillich's work that explain 
this prima facie puzzling phenomenon. This will occupy Section II. 
Then, in Section Ill, I shall draw attention to certain central elements of 
his theology and, in Section IV, I shall discuss a few of the questions and 
difficulties to which his position gives rise. Section V will summarize 
and present the paper's upshot. 
I1 
What explains the attractiveness of Tillich's work to those who are ill-
prepared to understand it or whose exposure to it is so limited as to 
make real understanding virtually impossible? 
To begin with, many of those who turn to Tillich's writings for illumi-
nation or inspiration do so, I suspect, because, though unable or unwill-
ing to view the religious life as thoroughly misguided, they find much 
traditional religious language either rebarbative or empty. In other 
words, they sense something deep and important in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, but they find the idea of Yahweh's choosing the ancient 
Hebrews as "his people" and leading their bloody conquest of Canaan, 
talk of the promptings of the Holy Spirit and Christ's "real presence" in 
the wafer and wine, discussions of substitutionary atonement and 
Christ's two natures, allusions to the Second Coming and the Last 
Judgment, and so on, as at best a stumbling block to participation in the 
religious life, at worst an insurmountable barrier. And they find in 
Tillich a religious thinker who is both steeped in the tradition and an 
apologist for Christianity, but who yet manages to write-at least fre-
quently-in ways that bypass traditional religious language4 and yet 
seem to convey something of profound religious significance. 
Then, too, Tillich is a theologian who insists that religious "truth" can 
never conflict with any scientific views. He holds, in other words, that 
there is no religious basis for disputing any of the claims of evolutionary 
biology or contemporary cosmology; any of the results of historical or 
archeological research concerning the origins or history of Christianity 
or any other religious sect or movement; or any findings about personal-
ity development or the neurophysiological or psychological causes of 
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religious experience.s Closely related to this feature of his thought are 
two other views. There is, first, his view that "faith," properly under-
stood, does not involve believing in the literal truth of propositions for 
which there is no evidence of a kind that would be at all convincing to 
an unprejudiced mind." And, second, there is his view that all theologi-
cal formulations are necessarily conditioned by the cultural contexts out 
of which they develop and so lacking in finality.7 These stands also, no 
doubt, are among the sources of his attractiveness. At any rate, not many 
of those who inhabit the intellectual world of the 20th century are pre-
pared to jettison the most impressive cognitive achievements of 
mankind in order to maintain their religious views intact. Nor are they 
disposed to swallow "holy whoppers"B for which nothing can be said or 
view theological doctrine as exempt from the ravages of time and the 
conceptual changes its passage brings at an ever increasing rate. 
Tillich's explicit rejection of a number of the ideas that are associated 
with traditional Christianity and that no longer have any purchase on 
the hearts and minds of a large number of 20th century people doubtless 
also plays a non-trivial role in explaining the congeniality of his writings 
to many. Among these rejected ideas are (a) supernaturalistic theism, the 
idea of God as an all-knowing, all-powerful being, who created the 
world at some point in the past, acts in the world to realize certain pur-
poses, etc.; (b) the idea that an event occurred in the past that involved 
the human race's falling from grace and that we are somehow all 
responsible for the self-centeredness, greed, and pride of human beings 
that are its consequences; (c) the idea that Jesus was a God-man, a being 
who was/is possessed of both human and divine natures; (d) the idea of 
heaven and hell as "places" to one of which each person goes after death 
and continues to have a sequence of temporally ordered experiences just 
as he or she did when living on the earth; and (e) the idea that Jesus will 
return to the earth at some time in the future and set up a court before 
which all those then living, together with the dead who have just been 
raised, will pass." 
Finally, such features of Tillich's thought as the following are proba-
bly also important to some degree in explaining the attractiveness of his 
writings even when they seem difficult to fathom. There is, first, his sen-
sitivity to the "problems" to which high religion has traditionally spo-
ken, "problems" that fall under such headings as "guilt," "death," and 
"meaninglessness," and that find classical biblical expression in such 
writings as Paul's letter to the Romans (chapter 8), Job, and 
Ecclesiastes.lf) There is, second, his anti-reductionism, i.e., his insistence 
that phenomena like aesthetic experience and the experience of the 
moral demand are not to be understood as, for example, merely the 
result of genetically-based dispositions that reflect nothing more than 
the selective advantage of genes that find phenotypic expression in such 
dispositions, but rather should be seen as revealing aspects of reality." 
Then too there is, third, his conviction that what lies at the core of all 
genuinely religious phenomena are certain experiences that reveal what 
is ultimately important, that generate within those who have them a 
kind of seriousness that attaches to nothing else in life, and that, in one 
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form or another, are ubiquitous and full of "healing" power, the power 
to mitigate-if only temporarily-the crippling anxieties that are the 
legacy of our moral failings, the whips and scorns of time, and the feel-
ing of the emptiness of our lives and pursuits that often engulfs US. 12 
And, last, there is his emphasis on the deep and ineluctable mystery that 
pervades existence and that is both catalyzed and expressed by the ques-
tion, "Why does anything exist at all?" -a theme that runs through the 
entire corpus of his writings and is expressed in ways that are com-
pelling and resonant.B 
11I 
How Tillich manages to incorporate the features of his thought I have 
just mentioned in an intellectual construction that purports to be a 
Christian theological system is, of course, a long and complex story. I 
shall not attempt to tell the whole of that story here. But I shall expound 
certain parts of it in order to provide a context for the questions and dif-
ficulties regarding Tillich's thought that I want to discuss. 
I noted above that Tillich thinks that certain experiences lie at the core 
of all of the historic religions and of all genuinely religious phenomena. I 
also noted that he believes they are, as he says, "revelatory" 
experiences.14 The reason why he speaks of them in this way has two 
parts. The first is that these experiences purport to be (or present them-
selves as) experiences in (or through) which something real is 
"unveiled""-indeed, experiences in (or through) which the "really 
real"l" or "ultimate reality"17 is revealed. The second part of his reason 
for holding these experiences to be revelatory is that they are of such a 
sort that those who have them are unable not to accept them at face 
value, so to speak, that is, are unable not to believe that they are in fact 
revelatory in the ways they purport to be. He puts this latter point in one 
place by speaking of "the manifestation of the really real"'R as resisting 
"absolutely any attempt to be dissolved into subjectivity."J" 
Tillich also holds that these experiences purport to be, and so are per-
force believed by their subjects to be, experiences of "something which is 
essentially and necessarily mysterious,"2o indeed, "an infinite mystery,"" 
as he says. This idea leads to-or is alternatively expressed by-his 
claim that what is revealed in revelatory experience is something that is 
not characterizable by the use of any of the concepts we apply in our 
ordinary, or even highly technical, thought and discourse about the 
world, or indeed by any concepts we (logically) could come to possess. 
Tillich puts this point by speaking of what is revealed in revelatory 
experience as "infinite"22 (i.e., non-finite), since the realm of finite things 
and events is the realm within which our concepts (and any concepts we 
could acquire) can be intelligibly said to have application.23 The central 
idea here apparently is that any concept we have (or could acquire) will, 
if it has application at all, apply strictly and literally to some item or 
items and not to others, and finite things, by definition, are things that 
stand over against and are distinguishable from other things, actual or 
possible.24 Moreover, since one of our concepts is the concept of exis-
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tence or of an existing thing, it follows that we cannot even speak of that 
which is unveiled in revelatory experience as existing.25 
So revelatory experiences, according to Tillich, present themselves as, 
and are necessarily believed by their subjects to be, experiences of some-
thing that is both really or ultimately real and ineluctably mysterious or 
ineffable. For this reason he sometimes describes them as experiences of 
a different dimension of reality-the "vertical" dimension2"-and also as 
experiences of what is "deepest" in reality-the "depth" dimension. 27 
The assemblage of finite objects and events is thus revealed by revelato-
ry experiences to be merely the "horizontal" dimension or the superfi-
cial aspect of reality. 
However, even though the aspect of reality that is unveiled in or 
through revelatory experiences is strictly ineffable, Tillich maintains that 
there is a vast range of "truths" that can be expressed about it nonethe-
less. On the face of it, this thesis is quite paradoxical, of course. But the 
paradoxical quality dissolves when one sees that none of what can be 
truly said of the infinite or ultimately real is properly taken literally and 
when one understands what it is for such a non-literal (or "symbolic") 
account of the infinite or ultimately real to be true, according to Tillich. 
The truth of an account or assertion about the non-finite does not, for 
Tillich, consist in its "agreement" or "correspondence" with the relevant 
facts, as is plausibly the case as regards assertions about aspects or fea-
tures of the realm of finite things. "The criterion of the truth of [an asser-
tion about the infinite] naturally cannot be the comparison of it with [the 
way it compares with or is similar to?] the reality to which it refers," 
Tillich writes, "just because this reality is beyond human corn pre hen-
sion."28 It may be, of course, that in saying this Tillich has the epistemic 
sense of 'criterion' in mind, i.e., the sense in which a criterion is a "way 
of telling" that such and such is true. However, the point also stands if, 
as is not implausible to assume, he has the constitutive sense of 'criteri-
on' in mind, i.e., the sense in which the criterion for the truth of proposi-
tion p is the state of affairs the holding of which would make p true. 
After all, how could a state of affairs that is "beyond human comprehen-
sion" be what it is that makes an assertion about the infinite true? If that 
were so, then we'd have no idea what the assertion in question asserted, 
given that the content of an assertion is or is given by the state of affairs 
it asserts to hold. 
However we are to read the criterion-passage I have quoted, such a 
denial of a correspondence theory of religious truth follows in any case 
from the various accounts of such truth that Tillich provides.29 Perhaps 
the clearest statement-at least in outline-of the account that is most 
central in his thinking appears in his book Dynamics of Faith. (I say "in 
outline" because the account requires filling out by reference to various 
things Tillich says elsewhere.) Even when filled out the account is far 
from pellucid, but I believe a plausible construal of what he seems to 
have in mind when all is said and done runs as follows. There are two 
constitutive "criteria"30 for the truth of an account of what is revealed by 
a revelatory experience. One is that the account be "alive,"'! where this 
means that the account possesses the power to catalyze revelatory expe-
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rience (and hence the faith-state or the state of being ultimately con-
cerned) in those to whom it is addressed. '2 The other criterion for the 
truth of such an account is that its "acceptance" involves appreciation of 
the fact that it lacks literal truth, i.e., is a "myth"33 or a "symbolic"34 
account. Since Tillich calls a myth "which is understood as a myth" a 
"broken myth,"35 one could say that an account satisfies this criterion 
just in case the account is a self-breaking one. 
To sum up what I have said so far: Tillich holds that reality is not 
reducible to the system of finite things that exist in space and time (the 
natural order) or, as he also puts it, "the entire realm of objective things 
and events."3G The reason reality is not to be so understood is that certain 
experiences reveal something, a dimension of the real, that transcends 
the finite realm. Moreover, Tillich maintains that nothing can be said 
about this dimension that is literally true;37 the infinite is ineffable. But 
some accounts of that which revelatory experiences reveal are, nonethe-
less, true-in a sense. These "true" accounts are the accounts that are 
either "alive," "self-breaking," or both. 3s 
I want next to draw attention to a certain semantic doctrine Tillich 
embraces and then to make some points about how the views I have so 
far ascribed to him are connected, on his view, with the ideas that make 
up classical Christian doctrine. 
The semantic doctrine Tillich holds to which I refer can be expressed 
thus. The theses that (a) reality is not reducible to the system of finite 
things and that (b) nothing can be said about what more there is that is 
literally true will be intelligible only to those who accept these theses. 
The reason Tillich is committed to this strange doctrine is not far to seek. 
He thinks that a necessary condition of anyone's understanding his talk 
of "the infinite," the vertical dimension, that which transcends the finite 
realm, etc. is that this person have had a revelatory experience;39 and, in 
addition, he thinks that no one can have such an experience without 
accepting it at face value, that is, accepting that what it purports to 
reveal it really does revea1.40 But these ideas obviously entail the seman-
tic doctrine in question. 
Turning now to the relation of Tillich's views to the ideas the make up 
the doctrinal scheme of classical Christianity, it's clear, to begin with, that 
at the center of this scheme is the idea of God. Now insofar as this is the 
idea of something that transcends the world of things in space and time, 
something that is beyond human comprehension, and something that is 
"ultimately" or "really" real-more real or more fully real than anything 
else?-then it is just the idea of "the infinite" that Tillich has. But tradi-
tionally the idea of God involves other ingredients as well. At any rate, 
God is thought to have features other than these whatever the proper 
analysis of the concept. Does Tillich do justice to such traditional ways of 
thinking about God when he identifies God with "the infinite," "the ver-
tical dimension," "the really real," etc., as he uses these expressions? 
I believe he does as regards the most central of these ways of thinking 
anyhow. For, in addition to revealing the reality of the infinite and its 
ineffability, revelatory experience, according to Tillich, purports to 
unveil-and so is believed by those who have such experiences to 
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unveil-"something ultimately important."" Insofar it presents itself 
as-and so is believed to be-"the manifestation of what concerns us 
ultimately,"42 i.e., something we cannot but take with unconditional seri-
ousness.B It's not implausible, I think, to maintain that among the most 
central features in the traditional Christian idea of God is the feature that 
Luther expressed when he said that God is "that to which [the] heart 
clings and entrusts itself."u And this is but a slightly different way of 
expressing the idea Tillich expresses when he speaks of God as that 
which "concerns us ultimately," as something which exceeds everything 
else in importance and which is properly taken with a kind of serious-
ness that is of a different order from that felt about anything else. 
But Tillich has a way of accommodating all the other ways of thinking 
about God that one finds in the Christian tradition, too. His way of 
doing this can be brought out by noting his way of answering the ques-
tion whether the term 'God' has a referent. 
His answer to this question is, I believe, threefold: "Yes," "No," and 
"Yes, but .... " Let me explain. The answer is "Yes" insofar as the word 
refers to that which is revealed in revelatory experience, viz., "the infi-
nite," "the really rea!," or "ultimate reality." The answer is "No," how-
ever, if a word refers only if it refers to "something," and it's true, as 
Tillich believes, that "to be something is to be finite."4s In other words, 
there is a sense in which the word 'God' doesn't have any referent at all, 
for Tillich, insofar as it fails to refer to something that possesses determi-
nate features which distinguish it from other things actual or possible, 
that can be an object of knowledge, that can be acted on, etc.-in short, 
insofar as it fails to refer to some finite reality. 
An obvious implication of this view-and one which Tillich explicitly 
accepts-is that even if there did exist an omniscient, omnipotent, per-
fectly good being who created the spatiotemporal realm and all its 
inhabitants, something Tillich thinks there is no reason to believe,46 this 
being would not be God. This is so because, as he uses the term 'finite', 
such a being would be a finite object, even if unlimited (and in that sense 
"infinite") as regards its knowledge, power, and goodness. Because he 
accepts this implication, there is a sense in which he is not able to accom-
modate with his conception of God a number of the features traditional-
ly ascribed to God, as well as many of the doctrines that imply or pre-
suppose that God is "finite" in Tillich's sense of the expression, e.g., the 
doctrine that Jesus possessed a divine nature as well as a human nature" 
and the doctrine that God causally intervenes in the historical process.4" 
This brings us to Tillich's third answer to the question whether 'God' 
refers, the "Yes, but ... " answer. The basis for ascribing an answer of this 
form to Tillich lies in the fact that, for Tillich, there is a sense in which 
'God' refers to a fictional object. As noted above, no account of what is 
revealed in revelatory experience is, for Tillich, literally true; in other 
words, all such accounts are, as he says, "mythological" or "symbolic." 
But the word 'God' appears in many such literally false accounts. So this 
is a use of the word according to which what it refers to is a fictional 
object in something close to the sense in which the names 'Hamlet' and 
'Paul Bunyon' refer to fictional objects. Thus in the story of Creation-in 
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either its biblical form or any of its more sophisticated theological 
forms-'God' refers to the being upon whose action(s) (or activity) the 
spatiotemporal world depends for its coming into existence and its 
remaining in existence; but since the story is not literally true but rather 
mythological in character, the referent of 'God' in the story does not 
really exist-any more than Sherlock Holmes really exists. Moreover, 
even if there were a being who created the spatiotemporal world and 
preserves it in existence, such a being would not be the referent of 'God' 
when the word appears in the myths any more than a historical person 
who was a detective, had the name 'Sherlock Holmes', and did many or 
all of the things Conan Doyle'S stories report Holmes as doing would be 
the referent of the name 'Sherlock Holmes' that appears in the stories. 
After all, the Sherlock Holmes of the stories is such that it is neither true 
nor false of him that he weighed exactly 163 lbs. on his 30th birthday-
assuming none of the stories contains any such description of Holmes; 
whereas it is either true or false of any historical person that he weighed 
exactly 163 lbs. on his 30th birthday if his life extends that far. The argu-
ment would be analogous for the case of 'God'. The actual creator, if 
there were one, would not be the referent of the term 'God' in the stories 
of Creation because the subject of the stories is essentially indeterminate 
in various respects in a wayan actual creator would not be. 
Similar points can be made, of course, in connection with the stories 
about the fall of man, the inspiration of the prophets, the incarnation, the 
emergence of the church, the second coming, and the last judgment, inter 
alia. None are literally true, for Tillich. So the references to God that are 
essential features of them all are references to a fictional object. And no 
entity that actually exists could be identical with such a fictional object. 
The upshot of this discussion of Tillich's answers to the question 
whether 'God' refers to anything is that Tillich's way of accommodating 
many of the features traditionally built into the concept of God (in par-
ticular, omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness), as well as 
many of the theological doctrines involving this concept that are part 
and parcel of classical Christianity, involves viewing these features as 
attributes of a fictional object and these doctrines as elements in a 
lengthy story about this object that is also essentially fictional. No doubt 
many will feel that this treatment does considerably less than justice to 
many of the fundamental ideas of classical Christianity. Tillich's 
response to a criticism of this sort would be not unlike Schleiermacher's 
to a similar criticism directed at him. Schleiermacher writes of "the con-
ception of a personal God" that it "is necessary whenever one would 
interpret to himself or to others immediate religious emotions, or when-
ever the heart has immediate intercourse with the Highest Being. Yet," 
he continues, "the profoundest of the church fathers have ever sought to 
purify the idea. Were the definite expression they have used to clear 
away what is human and limited in the form of personality put together, 
it would be as easy to say that they denied personality to God as that 
they ascribed it to Him." 49 Again, when "the representative imagination 
and the dialectic conscience ... fashion a too human personality,["the 
pious sense"] restrains by exhibiting the doubtful consequences" and 
GOD, REVELATION, AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH 11 
limits "the representation ... by negative formulas."'" Similarly, Tillich 
would respond by appealing to the mystical strain prominent in the the-
ological tradition-especially from the 2nd to the 14th centuries-and he 
would insist on the power of genuine revelatory experience to require 
the deliteralization of all religious and theological discourse.5J 
I conclude this brief account of Tillich's theological position with a 
few comments on the unusual language he employs in place of tradi-
tional Christian language when he presents and discusses the Christian 
doctrinal story. I refer here to his use of 'being itself', 'the power of 
being', and 'the ground and abyss of being' in place of 'God';52 his talk of 
Jesus as "the New Being" rather than as "the Christ" and "the 
Messiah"/' his replacement of 'sin' by 'estrangement';" his preference 
for 'the Spiritual Presence' over 'the Holy Spirit' and 'the Spiritual 
Community' over 'the (invisible) church';55 his employment of 
Schelling's expression 'essentialization' when elucidating the classical 
idea of "eternallife";56 his substitution of 'the transparency of all things 
to the ground of being' for 'the Kingdom of God';"7 and so on. 
Many find this neologistic jargon obscure. Others-especially tradi-
tional Christian believers-find it repellent. Their reason, of course, is 
that insofar as the jargon expresses any clear content at all, the content it 
expresses is, they feel, quite distinct from that conveyed by traditional 
Christian language. In addition, Tillich's strange language causes prob-
lems because it sometimes appears to be employed in ways that entail 
contradictions. Thus, in providing his account of what the idea of eternal 
life amounts to, Tillich insists, on the one hand, that eternal life involves 
the preservation of the individuality of each person while, on the other, 
also insisting that "it does not mean a continuation of temporal life after 
death."s> And in providing his understanding of the lithe fall," Tillich 
holds that it is not an event that took place in the past;59 yet he also holds 
that it is a state of things that we are responsible for and so presumably 
brought about. 60 Again, the New Being is said to be Jesus's being (or 
"essential being under the conditions of existence"6J) and hence "some-
thing that appears in a personal life,"62 but also something that is not 
separable from the biblical picture of Jesus's life/,3 the Spiritual 
Community that arose from that life,'" what is manifested in revelatory 
experiences a new state of things/" and the Kingdom of GodY 
However, all of these difficulties dissolve, it seems to me, once one 
recognizes that, for Tillich, everything said in the course of elucidating 
or "interpreting" traditional Christian language by employment of this 
different language is to be understood to be as devoid of literal truth as, 
on his view, assertions that use the traditional language are. Statements 
that use the traditional language are, he insists, mythological through 
and through, and his "interpretations" of these statements are, for the 
most part,oS just more of the same,"" despite being cast in language redo-
lent of the metaphysical tradition, especially the neoplatonic tradition. 
Thus, he insists repeatedly that his talk of the ground of being, the 
power of being, the abyss of being, etc. is symbolic (in his sense).70 He 
does, to be sure, say that the statement 'God is identical with being itself' 
is literally true. But he also implies, as I have noted above, that what this 
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identity claim really amounts to is the assertion that God is ineffable, 
that everything we correctly affirm of God has to be taken non-literally 
or symbolically.71 But now if this is so, then all the talk of the fall from 
essential being into existence, the New Being's coming into the world in 
Jesus, the Spiritual Presence's creating the Spiritual Community, essen-
tialization, etc. is perforce similarly symbolic. In the final analysis, it all 
functions to express what is revealed in revelatory experience, and since 
all language that serves this function is symbolic or mythological, every-
thing that is said using his non-traditional language has the same status. 
It follows that these accounts will not be obscure to those who have 
had revelatory experiences of the kind that they best express and will be 
quite unintelligible to those, if any-more on this later-, who have not 
had such experiences. 72 Moreover, the fact that these ways of talking 
appear to express ideas far removed from those expressed by traditional 
Christian language or involve contradictions is neither here nor there, 
from Tillich's point of view. What they literally express, if anything, is 
not what makes them an adequate expression of religious truth. No 
words, taken literally, are adequate in this way. And being contradictory 
is not a sufficient condition of a statement's lacking adequacy in this way 
either. For what makes an assertion or account an adequate expression of 
religious truth, to the extent that it is, is, from Tillich's perspective, (pri-
marily?) the fact that it is "alive" and (perhaps also) "self-breaking," and 
these characteristics can be present whatever the literal significance of a 
collection of words, however many contradictions an account involves, 
or indeed whether the words, taken together, make any sense at all: a 
"word salad" can be just as "alive" as the theology in Paul's letter to the 
Romans or Johann Gerhard's 9-volume theological tome, Loci Theologici. 
IV 
I turn now to a discussion of a number of questions and problems to 
which Tillich's thought naturally gives rise. For each I shall suggest, 
when I can, what seems to me to be the best response open to one who 
finds Tillich's theological orientation congenial. The discussion will 
require filling in many details that the foregoing outline of Tillich's 
thought omits. 
1. I have noted that Tillich regards his own singular elucidations or 
interpretations of Christian ideas-the ideas of creation, the fall, the 
incarnation, etc.-as mythological or symbolic and hence as having a 
status that, on his view, is in no way different either from that of tradi-
tional formulations of Christian truth or the biblical material that (in 
part) underlies these formulations. I have also drawn attention to his 
view that the "adequacy" of a mythic or symbol system as an expression 
of what is revealed in revelatory experience is determined by whether or 
not, or the extent to which, it is "alive" and "self-breaking." The first 
problem I shall consider arises because he also appears to give a special 
or privileged status to his own interpretations of traditional Christian 
ideas, and this appears to be inconsistent with the above view about the 
adequacy of a symbol system. 
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The basis for saying that he appears to give a special or privileged sta-
tus to his own interpretations is his claim that his "interpretations""-or 
"reinterpretations"74-present the "conceptual content"75 or "real mean-
ing"7o or "original meaning"77 or "fundamental meaning"78 of the ideas in 
these traditional formulations, and this claim clearly suggests that he 
thinks his ways of talking about creation, the fall, the incarnation, the 
Kingdom of God, eternal life, and so on are "better" than more tradition-
al ways-the ways one finds, for example, in Paul, Augustine, and 
Calvin; in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds; and in the Augsburg 
Confession and the Thirty-nine Articles.79 
Closely related to this problem is another. In section II above I indi-
cated that Tillich believes that any formulation of Christian truth will be 
culturally conditioned and insofar relative to a particular historical situ-
ation. One reason for this is that any such formulation will perforce 
make use of the conceptual materials available at the particular histori-
cal period in which it arises.so This view also appears incompatible with 
his idea that certain ways of expressing traditional ideas capture their 
conceptual content, whereas others are, in some sense, non-conceptual 
in character; and that certain expressions of traditional ideas convey 
their real or original or fundamental meaning, whereas others either dis-
tort that meaning or convey later semantic accretions or substitutions for 
it. For how could some formulation get at the conceptual content or 
real! original! fundamental meaning of certain ideas in a way others do 
not if every formulation is conceptually relative to the particular histori-
cal situation in which it arises? 
It might be thought, of course, that this latter problem is not serious 
because there has historically been a (more or less) continuous enrich-
ment of the conceptual materials available to thinkers, with the result 
that a 20th century thinker is in a better position to express the truth in 
traditional Christian formulations than his or her predecessors have 
been. But this won't do, from Tillich's point of view, because the central 
criteria of adequacy for an expression of religious truth is whether it's 
alive or self-breaking, and it's difficult to see any basis for thinking 
either feature will necessarily be greater in historical periods that are 
conceptually richer than their predecessors. 
A similar point can be made in connection with the former problem. 
It won't do to handle it by saying that only expressions of religious truth 
that are somehow conceptually better than earlier formulations of that 
truth or that somehow capture the real, original, or fundamental mean-
ing of such earlier formulations are really adequate expressions of the 
content of the revelatory experiences that lie behind the earlier formula-
tions because, again, there is no reason to suppose that any such expres-
sion of what the revelatory experiences in question reveal better meets 
the central criteria of adequacy Tillich lays out than any earlier (or dif-
ferent) expression. 
I suspect the best way out of these difficulties for Tillich-and anyone 
attracted to Tillich's general orientation-would be to give up the idea 
that the strange-sounding, murky, and occasionally incoherent rendi-
tions of traditional Christian ideas that he provides capture the concep-
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tual content or provide the real, original, or fundamental meaning of 
these ideas, and hold instead that these renditions have exactly the same 
status as any other attempts at articulating the ineffable content of reve-
latory experience and so are to be judged as regards their adequacy in 
the same way all others are judged, from his point of view. This is the 
best way out, I believe, for several reasons. First, it's hard to see how he 
could develop a significantly different set of criteria of adequacy for 
expressions of revealed truth, given the centrality to his thought of the 
idea that the content of revelatory experience is ineffable. Second, it 
would be very implausible to hold that attempts at articulating religious 
truth are not relative to the cultural situation out of which they arise, not 
to mention such a view's being incompatible with the ineffability thesis 
and the quasi-pragmaticR1 understanding of the adequacy of such articu-
lations that this thesis entails. Finally, the notions of an account's getting 
at the conceptual content of traditional Christian ideas, or expressing 
their real (original! fundamental) meaning, are neither clear as they 
stand nor provided any elucidation by Tillich. The "conceptual content" 
formulation has Hegelian overtones, of course.82 But that doesn't suffice 
to make the way of talking clear. And what is supposed to be the differ-
ence between giving expression to the "real" or "fundamental" meaning 
of a sentence, as opposed to its meaning? And are we to suppose the 
authors of the Nicene Creed didn't know what their sentences meant? 
The idea of expressing the "original" meaning of a form of words or col-
lection of sentences that has been repeated down the centuries is, of 
course, reasonably clear. But surely there is no basis whatever for think-
ing that Tillich's queer renditions of traditional Christian ideas do that. 
Did Paul have in mind the things Tillich says about God or eternal life 
when he invoked the concept? Did Augustine think that 'the fall' did not 
refer to a past event? Did Calvin mean by 'the wrath of God' what 
Tillich says is the correct interpretation of that "symbol," viz., that it is to 
be understood in such a way (i.a.) that God's wrath does not express a 
motive for action?" 
Tillich might, of course, claim that his renditions of traditional 
Christian ideas are more adequate than more familiar formulations of 
Christian doctrine on the ground that his are alive or self-breaking, and 
that these others are not-or perhaps not as alive and not as self-break-
ing. Such a claim, however, would not be very plausible. It's hard to see 
that the Tillichian accounts of creation, the fall, the incarnation, the king-
dom of God, and the second coming, for example, are such that "accept-
ing" them (or encountering them and having them in mind) necessarily 
issue in the recognition that they are not literally true. They won't neces-
sarily be seen to be incoherent or otherwise senseless; and if they aren't, 
what else about them would necessarily have this consequence? Nor is it 
obvious that Tillich's accounts are alive in a way that Billy Graham's 
theology is not-or more alive than such competitors. In any case, how 
alive a theological scheme is is, it seems, an empirical matter, and no evi-
dence is given or, I suspect, available in support of any claims about the 
aliveness or deadness of different schemes. 
2. Some additional questions involving the notion of a mythological 
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account and the idea of such an account's adequacy are the following. 
There is, first, the question of what the relation is between the adequacy 
of an account and the two criteria of adequacy 1 have described. Second, 
there is the question of what a myth's being alive really amounts to, and 
connected with this the question whether any myths really are alive. 
And, third, there is the question whether the program of deliteralization 
Tillich recommends is compatible with Christianity. I shall consider 
these questions seriatim. 
The adequacy (or "truth") of an account of what a revelatory experi-
ence reveals is determined for Tillich/4 I have said, by asking two ques-
tions: 0) Is it alive? and (2) Is it self-breaking? That is, does it tend to 
engender in those who embrace (or encounter?) it revelatory experience? 
And does it convey to those who embrace (or encounter?) it its status as 
myth? Now what exactly does this view amount to? Is it that satisfying 
one of these conditions makes an account adequate (or "true"), is it that 
an account that satisfies both conditions is more adequate ("truer") than 
one that only satisfies one, or is it that an account is adequate (or "true") 
only if it satisfies both conditions? Then, too, there is the question 
whether being alive and being self-breaking come is degrees. If they do, 
then a new cluster of related questions arises; spelling them out is left as 
an exercise for the reader. 
I don't think there are clear answers to any of these questions in 
Tillich's writings. Given his views about the variety" and ubiquity"6 of 
revelatory experiences, he would have done best to say that aliveness 
does come in degrees. And since people can be dimly as well as fully 
aware of a great variety of matters, he should have said the same of self-
breakingness. Then, it might be thought, the most plausible way of 
developing the idea he seems to have in mind as regards the adequacy 
of an account of the content of revelatory experiences would be to say 
that any such account is more or less adequate depending upon the 
extent to which it is both alive and self-breaking. These are independent 
criteria; both are important indicators of adequacy; and no account 
could be adequate at all that completely lacked either feature. That is, an 
account that was in no way conducive to revelatory experience would 
be wholly inadequate. And similarly for an account that failed to cat-
alyze in its adherents "the religious reservation,"87 the awareness that it 
was radically inadequate as a picture or representation of the truth. 
Turning now to the second question I distinguished at the outset of 
this discussion, what it is for an account to be "self-breaking" is relative-
ly clear. An account has this feature when something about it ensures 
that those who accept or understand it see that the account is wrongly 
understood if it is taken to be literally true. Somehow "the religious 
reservation" is built into the account; alternatively, the account embod-
ies the Protestant or prophetic principle88-the principle that says that 
any account of religious truth stands under the divine judgment and is 
insofar false in some way or ways-and embodies it in a reflexive way. 
In Christianity, this feature is present, according to Tillich, in virtue of 
the theme that "Jesus could not have been the Christ without sacrificing 
himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ."89 The Christian myth's contain-
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ing the story of the crucifixion of the God-man, in other words, is what 
ensures its self-breaking quality. 
However, what it is for an account to be alive is less clear. I said earli-
er that Tillich's view seems to be that an account is alive provided its 
acceptance catalyzes revelatory experience(s?) in its adherents. Since 
"faith," for Tillich, is the condition a person is in by virtue of his being 
the subject of a revelatory experience,"o the view might be alternatively 
expressed by saying that an account that is alive is one that generates the 
faith-state in anyone who embraces it. More fully, it gives rise in its 
adherents to a condition that is variously described as "shaking [and] 
transforming" ;91 as carrying a sense of being subject to an "unconditional 
claim" ;92 as a condition of "numinous astonishment" and "dread" ;93 as 
involving "judgment" and "healing" /' as being "grasped by a peace 
which is above reason'"'' and a "great and restful happiness";9(, as issuing 
in a life that involves increased sensitivity to others, freedom from self-
contempt and hubris, and a sense of the unconditional validity of moral 
requirements;"7 and as a state such that when 
we look at our finite concerns ... everything seems the same and yet 
everything is changed. Weare still concerned about all these things 
but differently-the anxiety is gone! It still exists and tries to 
return. But its power is broken; it cannot destroy us anymore.'" 
But how does embracing such an account generate faith, when the 
faith-state is understood in this way? Indeed, what is it to embrace such 
an account? Taking the latter question first, it's clear that embracing or 
accepting such an account cannot always be believing it. For to believe 
an account is to believe it to be true, and such accounts can only be 
believed true when they are not self-breaking. At best, in this case, it 
could be believed to be an adequate expression of the content of (a) reve-
latory experience. And this, for Tillich it seems, would be to believe that 
it is alive or self-breaking. So we do not get clear about what accepting 
such an account amounts to in the self-breaking case by saying it's 
believing the account to be adequate as an expression of the content of 
(a) revelatory experience. The circle is much too small! What could 
accepting an account that one recognizes to be symbolic be, then? 
There are two possibilities, I suggest. First, one might believe that the 
account bears some unspecific and unspecifiable analogy to the truth as 
revealed in revelatory experience. And Tillich does talk in ways that 
suggest he has something like this in mind. He says that symbolic 
accounts "participate" in the reality to which they point, as I have noted. 
But it's clear in view of his suggestion that such participation underlies 
the classical doctrine of a1lalogia elltis,"Y one naturally supposes it 
involves "identity (sameness) in certain respects and not in others." 
Unfortunately, this path leads to a deadend. So long as he sticks to the 
thesis that nothing can be said about the infinite that is literally true, the 
idea that one can give an account of it that bears some analogy to the 
truth about it is empty. For one would have no idea in what respect or 
respects the analogy(ies) held. Since there is no limit to the respects in 
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which one thing can be similar to another, it is vacuous to talk of a and b 
being similar when nothing can be said about the respect(s) in which the 
similarity holds.100 
The other possibility is that accepting a broken myth is like the rela-
tion a person has to a novel when he fully enters into the fictional world 
it depicts. He is, for example, saddened by the death of the hero's 
beloved, he is afraid that a terrible fate will overtake the orphaned child, 
he cares what happens to the elderly man who had a stroke on p. 359, 
and so on. In other words, a person embraces a broken myth when he-
at least often-thinks and feels in (many of the) ways that would be 
appropriate if he thought the myth literally true, despite recognizing 
that it isn't.101 
This conception of what acceptance of a broken myth comes to is, I 
think, intelligible. It also provides a good deal of insight into a condition 
that on the face of it is quite baffling, namely, that of the "believer" who, 
when pushed or when reflecting in her study, is prepared to acknowl-
edge that all of her "religious beliefs" are subject to the divine judgment, 
so to speak, i.e., do not really represent the way things are. But, unfortu-
nately, it leaves quite obscure how it is that acceptance of a broken myth 
could catalyze revelatory experience or generate the faith-state. 
Tillich (or one) might take the view that there is an empirical connec-
tion between embracing a broken myth in the sense explained and hav-
ing revelatory experience, and we just have no idea why this connection 
holds. But this line would not be very convincing. There is no evidence 
of any such connection. Nor is there even any evidence of such a connec-
tion between straightforward acceptance of the literal truth of a religious 
myth and the occurrence of revelatory experiences. 
It seems, then, that what it is for a myth to be alive can be elucidated, 
but whether any are alive in this sense is far from obvious. Perhaps what 
Tillich should have said, then, is that an account is alive just in case hav-
ing it frequently in mind can playa non-trivial role in keeping vividly 
before one's mind or deeply in one's heart the revelatory experience (or 
faith-state) that led one to embrace it in the first place. 
The third question I distinguished-the question whether the 
Tillichian idea that all accounts of religious truth should be "deliteral-
ized," i.e., understood as merely symbolic (in his sense), is compatible 
with classical Christianity-arises because Christianity is a historical 
religion, that is, a religion that essentially involves certain claims about 
what has happened in human history. How, it might be asked, could it 
be the case that all religious truths are symbolic in character and yet also 
the case that the truth of Christianity involves the truth of certain propo-
sitions about historical occurrences? 
This problem can be dealt with without any significant modification 
of Tillich's thought, I believe. As I have noted, Tillich distinguishes 
mythological formulations from that which these formulations seek to 
express, namely, the content of revelatory experience. That God, the 
Creator of all things visible and invisible, 2000 years ago came down 
from heaven and took on human form, was crucified, died, and then 
three days later rose from the dead, is a part of the Christian myth, for 
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Tillich. None of this involves any historical claims since, properly under-
stood, it involves no claims of a literal kind at all. On the other hand, 
that a man named Jesus, who hailed from Nazareth, carried on an itiner-
ant ministry in Palestine 2000 years ago, a ministry that culminated in 
his death on a cross in his early 30s, is a historical truth. So also is the 
proposition that his followers became convinced of his resurrection, 
formed a Jewish sect, which, as a result largely of the work of Paul of 
Tarsus, eventually developed into a non-Jewish religious community 
that spread throughout the Roman Empire. But these latter truths are 
not peculiarly religious; they are not what make Christianity a historical 
religion. It's rather the identification of a figure in the myth with a his-
torical person, and related theses, that link Christianity with historical 
occurrences. This identification and its congeners, however, do not 
entail that any peculiarly religious truth-in particular Christian truth-
is non-symbolic in character. It's a religious truth that Jesus was the 
Christ, but that is not a matter of history, i.e., a matter that might be con-
firmed or disconfirmed by historical investigation. What makes that the-
sis "true" is its adequacy as an expression of revelatory experience. And 
the criteria of such adequacy are that the thesis, or better the entire myth 
of which it is a part, be alive and self-breaking. 
If the question is raised as to why that particular historical personage 
was selected as the fitting subject for the Jewish messianic label, the 
answer, of course, is that he was just one of many to whom the label was 
attached. In his case, of course, a successful religion arose and a highly 
reticulate mythology with it. Why was this? Tillich's answer is a variant 
on 5chleiermacher's. It goes in outline thus, I believe. Participation in the 
life of the church plays a non-trivial role in catalyzing revelatory experi-
ences. The best explanation of this involves appeal to the power of the 
New Testament records to catalyze such experience. The best explana-
tion of the existence of this biblical material is that it arose as an aspect 
of and in response to life in the early church and, in particular, the reve-
latory experience that it both catalyzed and expressed. The best explana-
tion of these facts about the early church is that contact with Jesus him-
self was a powerful mediator or source of revelatory experience. The 
best explanation of this is that revelatory experience played a powerful 
and pervasive role in making him the person he was. Finally, it was 
because he was the person he was-at least in part-that his life gave 
rise to the early church, the New Testament records, and the religion 
that became Christianity and eventually spread to all four corners of the 
earth owing to the capacity of the religious community in which it was 
embodied to engender revelatory experience in its participants. '02 
3. Another problem that Tillich's mature thought raises derives from 
his insistence, on the one hand, that revelatory experience is not "univer-
sal," that is, is not "occurring always and everywhere";1D3 and his insis-
tence, on the other, that it is "universal" in the sense that no one has not 
had one or more revelatory experiences. " ... to say that these statements 
[e.g., that "that which is ultimately real is good"] are really meaning-
less," Tillich says in a late work that is the record of a seminar he gave in 
the spring of 1963 at the University of California at Santa Barbara, "is 
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possible only if one has no personal experience ... of something uncondi-
tional and infinite .... "'o4 "Now an incapacity for musical experience may 
possibly exist among some individuals," he continues, "but I am 
absolutely certain that the lack of experience of something ultimately 
important or serious does not exist in any human being." J[lS It is impor-
tant in this connection to realize what Tillich means by an "experience of 
something ultimately important or serious." He explains the idea earlier 
in the seminar thus: " ... the unconditional or ultimate should not be 
viewed as part of a pyramid, even if its place is at the top." Why? 
Because, the context makes clear, if the ultimate were conceived in this 
way, the object of "ultimate concern" would still be "in the realm of the 
finite"; an ultimate concern-a concern directed at the ultimate-would 
be like a "concern for my wife, for my children, for my job, [or] for my 
work."lU6 But the kind of concern that revelatory experience evokes is a 
"qualitatively different concernl/107 or a concern with something "qualita-
tively different" from anything finite. 
Why does Tillich's denial that revelatory experiences are "occurring 
always and everywhere," when taken together with his insistence that 
no one has failed to have revelatory experience, create a problem? The 
reason is not that these two claims are inconsistent-they're clearly not. 
The problem rather is that if revelatory experience is not universal in the 
first sense, it is difficult to see why Tillich is so sure it is universal in the 
second sense. For consider. If revelatory experience is an occasional 
occurrence, as the first non-universality claim entails, it's hard to see 
why it couldn't be the case that some people manage to live their entire 
lives-which may, after all, be prematurely cut short-without having 
such an experience. And if it could be that some do manage this, even if 
they don't in actual fact, how could Tillich be "absolutely certain" that 
this possibility isn't realized. In addition, it does seem pretty obvious 
that many people have never had an experience that they would describe 
as an experience of something that is "ultimately important," where an 
experience of this kind is not just an experience of something that is 
"very important or very, very important,"108 but is rather an experience of 
something such that "nothing is comparable with it in importance."w9 
And if they wouldn't concede they'd had such an experience, what gives 
Tillich his certainty that nonetheless each has had an experience it would 
be correct to describe in these terms? 
It's not difficult, of course, to see why Tillich is attracted to the first 
thesis. What lies behind the denial of the universality (in the relevant 
sense) of revelatory experience is Tillich's view about the features that 
are always present whenever there occurs a "revelatory constellation.,,!!n 
To begin, any revelatory experience, on Tillich's view will be an experi-
ence that presents itself as (or purports to be) as revelation of "an infinite 
mystery,"111 of "something which is essentially and necessarily mysteri-
OUS.""2 Moreover, such an experience involves what he speaks of as 
"ontological shock,"113 which is "a state of mind in which the mind is 
thrown out of its normal balance, shaken in its structure,"114 a state of 
mind that is expressed by questions like "Why is there something? Why 
not nothing?"115 However, this state of mind is not just "present" when-
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ever there a revelatory experience; it is also "overcome." "In revelation 
... the ontological shock is present and overcome at the same time. It is 
present in the annihilating power of the divine presence (mysterium 
tremendum) and is overcome in the elevating power of the divine pres-
ence (mysterium jascinosum)."'16 He also speaks of revelatory experience 
as characterized by the presence of "'numinous' dread"ll? in the subject 
and "the feeling that the solid ground of ordinary reality is taken 'out 
from under' [his] feet."118 Yet it's also the case that "the center of his per-
sonality is transformed: he has received saving power,"lI q i.e., the power 
that "heals" and makes "whole."llo In view of this depiction of the reve-
latory experience, it is not difficult to see what lies behind Tillich's 
denial that revelatory experience is "occurring always and everywhere." 
It's obvious that people are not always and everywhere undergoing 
such shaking and transforming experiences of what purports to be an 
infinite mystery, etc. 
Why Tillich insists that no one fails to have revelatory experience is 
less evident. But I suspect he is moved by considerations like the follow-
ing. First and perhaps most central is his conviction that all finite things, 
to the extent that they are real at all, are so in virtue of their relation to-
he says "participation" in-that which is ultimately (or really) real. 121 
Given this conviction, it should not be surprising that he thinks that at 
some level or in some way every human being experiences-even if 
unconsciously-the "infinite mystery." But no doubt his conviction that 
everybody is serious about something and serious in a way that is (in 
some sense) "unconditional" plays a role, toO.122 For this kind of serious-
ness, on his view, can have no other source, in the final analysis, than 
revelatory experience. 
There are, I think, two ways in which Tillich could handle the prob-
lem raised by these claims about the non-universality of revelatory expe-
rience in one sense and its universality in another. The best of them, in 
my judgment, would be simply to retreat from the second of these 
claims. He does insist, after all, that simply being serious about some-
thing-even if the seriousness is, on any natural way of taking the 
expression, "unconditional" - is not to be concerned with something 
"qualitatively different" from anything in the finite realml" So the mere 
fact that people frequently are very serious about certain matters does 
not provide any basis for his thesis about the ubiquity (or universality in 
the second sense) of revelatory experience. And given the very unusual 
features of revelatory experience on his view, which I have noted above, 
it's hard to see how a person could have such an experience and be 
unaware of he was having it. Also, it's hard to see why "participation" 
in that which is really real should be sufficient for the occurrence of such 
experiences, given that they are not occurring "always and everywhere." 
If he were to solve the problem in this way, he would, I think, have to 
abandon an idea of considerable importance to him, however. This is the 
idea embodied in his slogan "Religion is the substance of culture and 
culture is the expression [or form] of religion." 124 Religion is simply not 
sufficiently pervasive-at least in the current culture of the industrial-
ized West-to make true anything close to such a thesis, assuming that 
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religion is understood as a phenomenon that is rooted in revelatory 
experience and that revelatory experience is not present wherever there 
is seriousness about some project, idea, policy, person, or social issue. 
The other way of handling the problem avoids this cost. It would con-
sist in modifying his understanding of what counts as revelatory experi-
ence. He could do this by taking the features he mentions in characteriz-
ing revelatory experience as definitive only of paradigm revelatory expe-
riences, or revelatory experiences of an especially powerful and singular 
kind. This move would make it possible for him to allow for revelatory 
experience of less pronounced kinds-indeed, for a continuum of revela-
tory experience at one end of which lie the experiences he describes in 
the section of his Systematic Theology called "The Meaning of Revelation" 
and at the other end of which lie experiences of the sort that underlie the 
kind of seriousness characteristic of anybody who isn't, as he says, 
"deprived completely of a center [or "dominating center"]."l2i 
If he solved the problem in this way, he might still have to give up the 
ubiquity claim-and so concede, as seems plausible, that some people 
lack a dominating center-but he'd be able to hold a thesis pretty close 
to it. And he could keep the non-universality claim by restricting it so 
that it covered only the revelatory experiences at the far end of the con-
tinuum. Moreover, there would be a good deal of plausibility to the idea 
his "religion and culture" slogan encapsulates. 
Still, the second solutioryis less attractive than the first, I think. The 
reason lies in the implausibility of claiming that any experience that 
underlies a person's coming to be serious about something is an experi-
ence which purports to be an experience of ultimate reality or the really 
real and in that way is different from the ordinary experiences we have 
while knocking about the world. And once that feature of revelatory 
experience is dropped, the idea at the very center of Tillich's theology is 
undermined. 
4. Revelatory experiences, on Tillich's view, naturally express them-
selves in myth and symbol or, as he also says, give rise to "theoretical 
interpretations" of these experiences. Moreover, some of these mythical 
expressions (or theoretical interpretations) are "more adequate" (or 
"truer") than others. What it is for such an expression (or interpretation) 
to be more adequate (or truer) than another I have discussed above. Tillich 
also holds that revelatory experiences naturally express themselves in 
codes of conduct; that is, they give rise to "practical" as well as "theoreti-
cal" interpretations.12(, This view is also problematic. Parallel to the prob-
lem of understanding what the adequacy of a theoretical interpretation of 
a revelatory experience amounts to for Tillich is that of saying what it is 
for a practical interpretation of such an experience to be adequate. 
It's clear, I think, that much of what Tillich says about how revelatory 
experience bears upon the moral life is not relevant to this problem. (Nor 
I might add, is it especially plausible-at least if we focus on what I 
spoke of earlier as the paradigmatic revelatory experience.) He says, for 
example, (a) that revelatory experience lies behind our awareness of "the 
unconditional validity of the moral imperative,""7 as well as (b) the "seri-
ousness" with which we take this imperative. 128 It also generates (c) "the 
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courage to judge the particular"12Y-that is, make moral judgments in par-
ticular cases-a necessary trait given the possibility (and presumably 
one's awareness of the possibility) that one can always go awry in such 
judgments as a result of "misconceiving the situation."'lCl And Cd) it gives 
rise to a certain freedom from the kind of "hatred" for the demands 
morality makes of us.13J But none of this, obviously, provides an answer 
to the question of what it is that makes a "practical interpretation" of a 
revelatory experience adequate to that experience. For all of (a)-(d) could 
be true of individuals whose "interpretations" of the practical import of 
their revelatory experiences were widely divergent. One interpretation, 
for example, might imply the (prima facie) wrongness of (i) first trimester 
abortion in virtually every case, (ii) the institution of capital punishment 
in a legal system with the general structure of the one current in the 
United States today, (iii) failing to make sacrifices to help those in need or 
jeopardy that are virtually as great as the costs they will bear if not aided. 
Another might contain principles that (i*) sanction first trimester abortion 
in all cases, (ii*) condone capital punishment as it exists in the United 
States today, and (iii*) always permit failures to come to the aid of others 
when the cost of doing so carries a serious risk to or sacrifice of the well-
being of him or her who has the power to help. 
What, then, is Tillich's solution to the problem at issue? So far as I can 
see, it consists in holding that a practical interpretation is adequate just 
in case the norms or principles of conduct it involves are not taken as 
binding in all situations; or, in other words, that it include a caveat to the 
effect that any of the norms or principles of conduct it involves can, and 
under certain circumstances will, entail incorrect moral judgments in 
concrete situations. Here are some of the relevant passages: 
The Spirit judges all commandments.m 
Revelation is not informative, and it is certainly not informative 
about ethical rules or norms. All the ethical material, for example, 
of the Old and New Testaments, is open to ethical criticism .... 133 
The Spirit does not produce new and more refined ... command-
ments.134 
... the moral law ... is transcended in its form as law. n5 
... all ethical contents [exhibit] historical relativity.136 
[One goes wrong] to elevate any moral content [ i.e., any moral 
principle or abstract norm] ... to unconditional validity .... 137 
The wisdom of the ages and the ethical expressions of the past 
(including revelatory experiences) [give] an overwhelming signifi-
cance to the formulated ethical norms, but it does not give them 
unconditional validity.138 
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Under the impact of the prophetic criticism [i.e., the criticism reve-
latory experience generates] moral laws change their meaning or 
are abrogated altogether.13Q 
Adequacy, then, as regards practical interpretations of revelatory 
experience is similar in an important respect to adequacy as regards the-
oretical interpretations. The latter are (most?) adequate, Tillich suggests 
(in part), when they are, as I have put it, "self-breaking." That is, when 
the interpretations are such that to accept them is to see that they are not 
literally true. Practical interpretations, he seems to say, are adequate just 
in case they involve an analogous feature. To accept such an interpreta-
tion is to see that it will not yield correct moral judgments in all situa-
tions-and, indeed, perhaps in (virtually) none. 1• O At any rate, this is, I 
think, a plausible way of taking some of TilJich's words that bear on the 
problem in question. 
What is problematic about all of this? In my judgment, the idea that 
revelatory experiences give rise to codes of conduct-and, in this sense, 
to practical interpretations-in the first place. To be sure, if Tillich were 
able to make the case that revelatory experience is both ubiquitous and 
extremely various, ranging from the paradigm experiences which Otto 
sought to clarify to experiences of great to more or less mild seriousness 
about threats to one's job, receding hair, or the condition of the paint on 
one's 10-year-old Volvo 240, then it would be easy to hold that at least 
some revelatory experiences lie behind and contribute to the develop-
ment of codes of conduct. But I have argued above that going along this 
path raises serious problems for Tillich's theology. But if he takes revela-
tory experiences to be the very special experiences he describes in the 
section of his Systematic Theology alluded to above, drawing on Otto's 
discussion in The Idea of the Holy,!41 as I have suggested he should, then 
the idea he has that such experiences have "practical interpretations" 
stands in need of defense-defense which, J believe, he would be hard-
pressed to provide. 
A better path for him to have followed here, I think, is the path 
Schleiermacher takes in the Reden. Concerning "piety" (or "faith") 
understood as the state a religious person is in qua religious or the state 
he speaks of in The Christian Faitlz 142 as "God-consciousness," 
Schleiermacher writes: 
'" piety and morality ... are two different functions of one and the 
same life. But while man does nothing from religion, he should do 
everything with religion. Uninterruptedly, like a sacred music, the 
religious feelings should accompany his active life. I•3 
Thus, instead of holding that revelatory experience is susceptible of 
"practical interpretation" or naturally issues in a code (or codes) of con-
duct, Tillich would have done better to think of morality as an aspect of 
human life that is quite independent of the religiosity which is directly 
rooted in revelatory experience and to hold that the impact of revelatory 
experience upon the subject's sense of right conduct and actual behavior 
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is analogous to the impact (if any) that the presence of the choral move-
ment of Beethoven's Ninth running through his or her mind might have. 
Such a position would clearly avoid the difficulty noted, and in a way 
that would carry a good deal of plausibility. Why, after all, should an 
experience of the mysteriu11l tremendu11l et fl1scinosll1n-to use Otto's 
expression-play any role at all in making clear whether first trimester 
abortions, the institution of capital punishment, or using fatal force 
against an innocent aggressor in defense of a third party are morally 
legitimate? Moreover, the same should, I think, be said in connection 
with such practical questions as what one should do with one's life, 
which Tillich also thinks is (or can be) "answered" by revelatory experi-
ence. 144 
5. Yet another problem is posed for Tillich by what he says about 
God. I have drawn attention above to the fact that, for Tillich, the name 
'God'-at least in its central use-designates that which is (allegedly) 
revealed in revelatory experience and alternatively referred to as "the 
infinite," "the eternaL" "the absolute," "the really reaL" "ultimate reali-
ty," and the "object" of our "ultimate concern." Since what is revealed in 
revelatory experience is ineffable, he also holds that there are no literally 
true statements about God.14' 
The problem I want finally to highlight arises from this idea that 
nothing can be said of God that is literally true. It can be expressed by 
the following line of thought. Assume it is correct that there are no liter-
ally true statements about God. Then consider both of the following pos-
sible cases: (i) the case in which God is not distinct from (is strictly iden-
tical with) the world and (ii) the case in which God is distinct from (is 
not strictly identical with) the world. (Here 'the world' refers to the 
aggregate of finite things and events.) Suppose (i) obtains. Then it will 
obviously be false that there are no literally true statements about God. 
After all, it is literally true, for example, that the world is spatial and 
temporal, contains events that are causally related, contains a large num-
ber of rational agents, as well as many non-rational animals and plants, 
and so on. So if God just is the world, there will be countless literally 
true statements about God. Now suppose case (ii) obtains, that God is 
not strictly identical with the aggregate of finite things and events, that 
God is (in some sense) other than or more than the world. If this case 
obtains, then it will also be true that there are literally true statements 
about God. It will be literally true, for example, that God is not strictly 
identical with the world. Also, how could it fail to be the case that there 
were countless literally true statements about the relations of various 
parts of the world to this "object" that is not identical with the world? In 
short, if we assume that there are no literally true statements about God, 
we find that it can't be true that either case (i) obtains or that case (ii) 
obtains. But these cases exhaust the possibilities. Hence, it must be false 
that there are no literally true statements about God.146 
Tillich might respond to this problem by simply denying that finite 
things-and hence, presumably, the aggregate of finite things scattered 
around in space and time-are real; anyhow, that they are fully or rCI111y 
real. He does, after all, speak of God as the really real. And he says that 
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every finite thing is a mixture of being and non-being, a claim he 
explains by saying that everything finite "is being in the process of com-
ing from and going toward nonbeing."'" He also speaks of "finitude" as 
"being, limited by nonbeing,"'" where "nonbeing" is what "appears as 
the 'not yet' of being and the 'no more' of being"'" and as that which 
"confronts that which is [something] with a definite end (finis)."'50 
Even if we could make sense of these ways of talking-and I have 
serious doubts about this-they hardly yield a happy solution to the 
problem. For to hold that the world is not "really real" or is, in some 
sense, mixed with (full of?) nonbeing is not, it seems, to hold that the 
world's existence is an illusion. But it's this full-blown non-existence (or 
non-reality) claim that Tillich needs to solve the problem along these 
lines. Otherwise, the argument will obviously go through in a slightly 
modified form and the problem will still be there. 
Unfortunately, to bite the bullet and insist that the world's existence 
is in the same boat with the pink rats "seen" by those suffering from 
delirium tremens-as is done in the Vedantist tradition (by Shankara, 
for example)-does not solve the problem in a way that is very attrac-
tive, either. It shows too great a lack of that "robust sense of reality" 
which is part and parcel of common sense. And how could the world of 
finite things be an illusion if it's an illusion that anyone is under the illu-
sion that there is such a world of finite things?15' 
Another solution to the problem-equally as radical, in my judg-
ment-would be to relinquish the principle of the indiscernibility of 
identicals which is appealed to implicitly at several points in the argu-
ment that gives rise to the problem. But to hold that a can be the very 
same thing as b even though something is true of a that is not true of b is 
to hold that one thing can both have and lack some feature at the same 
time and in the same respect. And to give up this is to give up rational 
thought altogether. 
In view of these considerations, it might be thought that the only 
alternative for Tillich is to give up the ineffability doctrine-at least in 
the form in which he embraces it. And it might be said on behalf of this 
approach that there's no alternative to it anyway since obvious contra-
dictions result if it isn't given up-as has often been pointed OUt.152 It's a 
logical truth after all that, for any property whatever and any referential 
expression, if the referential expression refers, what it refers to either 
possesses the property or it possesses its complement. Also, if God is 
what is revealed in revelatory experience, why isn't it literally true of 
God that He is revealed in revelatory experience? Again, if 'God' and 
'ultimate reality' refer to the same thing, why isn't it literally true of God 
that He has the property of being identical with ultimate reality? 
I suspect Tillich would be reluctant to embrace this way out, despite 
the necessity of modifying his "no literal truths about God" claim to 
avoid paradox. That is, even if he were to modify his ineffability thesis 
to avoid difficulties of the kind just mentioned, he wouldn't, I suspect, 
be willing to retract it to any extent that would avoid the problem alto-
gether. The conception of revelatory experience that gives rise to the 
ineffability thesis is too central in his thought for that. 
26 Faith and Philosophy 
The solution that is most in line with what is central to Tillich's posi-
tion, it seems to me, is one that simply concedes that his ways of talking 
about God and the world do not make sense, even though they are the 
ways that best express the character of revelatory experience. They are 
the ways that will seem right to those who have had revelatory experi-
ence, even though when we take the words in a natural way and think 
through their implications we see that nothing can be made of them. 
Some may feel that a solution of this kind throws out the baby with 
the bath water, but in mitigation of this worry one might point out that a 
thinker who is far from being an enemy of religion and whom many 
hold to be, if not the first philosopher of the age, at least in the class of 
those who are the most promising candidates for such a status, namely, 
Wittgenstein, held a view in the late 20s and early 30s not unlike this. 
Here are two of the relevant passages: 
... when we speak of God and that he sees everything and when we 
kneel and pray to him all our terms and actions seem to be parts of 
a great and elaborate allegory which represents him as a human 
being of great power whose grace we try to win, etc., etc .... Thus in 
... religious language we seem constantly to be using similes. But a 
simile must be a simile for something. And if I can describe a fact by 
means of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and to 
describe the facts without it. Now in our case [i.e., the religious 
case] as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the 
facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts. 
And so, what at first appeared to be a simile now seems to be mere 
nonsense .... My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all 
men who have ever tried to write or talk ... Religion was to run 
against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls 
of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. ls3 
Is speech essential for religion? I can quite well imagine a religion 
in which there are no doctrines, and hence nothing is said. 
Obviously the essence of religion can have nothing to do with the 
fact that speech occurs-or rather: if speech does occur, this itself is 
a component of religious behavior and not a theory. Therefore 
nothing turns on whether the words are true, false, or nonsensical. 1'4 
v 
My aim in this essay was been to do three things. First, I have tried to 
say what it is about Tillich's work that has made it attractive to a wide 
audience, despite the obscurity of so much of it. Second, I have endeav-
ored to state as clearly as possible what I believe to be the central ele-
ments of his theological position. And, third, I have sought to present a 
few of the questions and problems to which his theology gives rise, and 
to suggest how they might be addressed with the least damage to the 
central thrust of his thought. 
The upshot of the discussion is that at least most of these problems 
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can be dealt with in a relatively happy way from the standpoint of some-
one sympathetic either with Tillich's position and concerned to salvage 
as much as possible. Whether Tillich himself would be satisfied with the 
responses I have suggested is, of course, far from clear. He does report 
having once said to a Logical Positivist that he "would like him to attend 
my lectures and to raise a finger if something is said that lacks rationali-
ty."IS" This suggests that he thought his words would always strike an 
unprejudiced mind as thoroughly reasonable. If, as I hope, my preferred 
responses to the questions and problems 1 have raised are responses that 
make Tillich's views more reasonable than any alternative, then the 
report in question provides at least some evidence that Tillich himself 
would have found these responses congenial. 
(1 should perhaps note that he also reports that the philosopher in 
question refused the invitation on the ground that his finger would have 
to be raised all the time.)156 
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